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RACE, DIGNITY, AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY
R.A. Lenhardt*
INTRODUCTION
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges1 asserts legal
marriage’s capacity to afford same-sex couples a measure of “equal
dignity” and belonging too long denied.2 In this Essay, I ask whether there
is any reason to believe that marriage could do the same for African
Americans. Could broader entrance into marriage, as some conservatives
suggest, provide Blacks—gay and straight—a measure of belonging that
has been frustratingly elusive,3 even as the nation prepares to celebrate the
one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
ratification?
The language of Justice Kennedy’s opinion—which casts marriage as an
“enduring bond, [through which] two persons together can find other
freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality,” irrespective of
sexual orientation, gender, or race—suggests that this question should be
answered in the affirmative.4 But I am deeply skeptical of this claim.
While I do not dispute that exclusion from legal marriage imposes real
citizenship harms5 and celebrate the outcome in Obergefell, I am not
convinced that access to marital rights, without more, magically cures the
stigma, deprivation, disparate treatment, and harm that come with outsider
status. Indeed, marriage regulation, in some instances, could very well
exacerbate these wrongs.6
Even as it secures rights for LGBT Americans, Obergefell crafts a
whitewashed version of marriage and dignity inconsistent with the actual
experience of African Americans and other minorities with marriage. The
relevant history demonstrates that legal marriage in this country has, in fact,
too often not enhanced dignity for African Americans and other minority
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Id. at 2608.
3. See, e.g., Kay S. Hymowitz, Opinion, How Single Motherhood Hurts Kids, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/08/howsingle-motherhood-hurts-kids/?_r=0 (discussing the correlation between single motherhood
and poverty) [http://perma.cc/4MFM-U9Z6].
4. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
5. See R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and
the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 889–99 (2008).
6. See Katherine M. Franke, Opinion, Marriage Is a Mixed Blessing, N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html [http://perma.cc/
8ZGW-C2E7].
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Indeed, it has very often diminished black dignity and
groups.7
citizenship.8
Even more—as recent police shootings of black men and women,9 new
revelations about the extent of Blacks’ mistreatment in the judicial
system,10 and growing evidence of the cumulative disadvantage and despair
that marks African American life11 make plain—marriage, without more, is
unlikely to secure black belonging anytime soon. Today, Blacks are the
most unmarried group of any in the country.12 Instead of looking for black
dignity in marriage exclusively, I thus urge a greater focus on nonmarriage
and greater attentiveness in law, policy, and even the advocacy efforts of
groups such as “Black Lives Matter” to the ways in which family law
structures, such as marriage, function to shape race—how it is defined,
understood, and experienced—and inequality in ways that deny dignity and
impede the flourishing of black families.13
I. COLOR-BLIND DIGNITY AND THE HISTORY
OF RACE AND MARRIAGE OBERGEFELL IGNORES
The question this Essay engages—whether marriage might be dignity
enhancing for twenty-first century African America—is one that Justice
Kennedy would likely find curious, if not offensive. Although arguably not
as hostile to considering race as others on the Court,14 he has expressed real
skepticism about race in the past, especially where government decisions
7. See R.A. Lenhardt, Marriage As Black Citizenship?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1317, 1324–
43 (2015).
8. See id.
9. See Lydia Polgreen, From Ferguson to Charleston and Beyond, Anguish About Race
Keeps Building, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/fromferguson-to-charleston-and-beyond-anguish-about-race-keeps-building.html
[http://perma.cc/77CC-MT6H].
10. See generally Shaila Dewan, A Surreptitious Courtroom Video Prompts Changes in
a Georgia Town, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/05/us/asurreptitious-courtroom-video-prompts-changes-in-a-georgia-town.html (detailing harsh
treatment and incarceration of poor individuals unable to pay municipal fines and penalties)
[http://perma.cc/9ZB3-4ZX7].
11. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE MAKING OF FERGUSON:
PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), http://s3.epi.org/files/
2014/making-of-ferguson-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GHF-D3DT].
12. D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., NEW MARRIAGES DOWN 5% FROM 2009
TO 2010: BARELY HALF OF U.S. ADULTS ARE MARRIED—A RECORD LOW 8 (2011),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/12/Marriage-Decline.pdf [http://perma.cc/9FY7SWA7].
13. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS (2014) (arguing that the legal regulation of the family undermines the
family).
14. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007), a case concerning the voluntary consideration of race as a factor in school
assignment decisions, Chief Justice Roberts infamously asserted in his plurality opinion that
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.” Id. at 748. In contrast, Justice Kennedy argued in his concurrence that certain raceconscious measures designed to combat racial isolation are permissible. See id. at 787–88
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527,
1566–67 (2010) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved).
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might be understood to classify or regard an individual on the basis of their
racial identity.15 Indeed, in his plurality opinion in Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action,16 Justice Kennedy went so far as to suggest that,
given the extent to which racial “lines are becoming more blurred,” race
may simply not be as salient today, notwithstanding evidence of racial
inequality across American society.17 Further, from a doctrinal perspective,
he has increasingly moved away from equal protection analyses typically
associated with race and embraced notions of liberty and dignity in
addressing LGBT rights in cases such as Lawrence v. Texas18 and United
States v. Windsor.19
In Obergefell, all this translates into a color-blind conception of dignity
that, even with Justice Kennedy’s observations about stigma, privileges an
atomistic conception of liberty only tangentially associated with groupbased concerns.20 For example, although many of the amicus briefs
submitted to the Obergefell Court deal with matters of race at length,21 the
majority opinion only references it a handful of times.22 Indeed, so intent is
Justice Kennedy on telling an affirmative story about dignity and marriage
that he fails even to mention the denial of marriage rights to Blacks during
slavery in his discussion of the negative “developments in law and society”
affected by marriage.23 This omission is glaring, particularly given the
ways in which exclusion from legal marriage helped to reaffirm Blacks’
slave status and to stigmatize blackness itself in ways that remain
consequential.24
The majority opinion does engage Loving v. Virginia25 at various
points.26 That decision, of course, supports the “double helix”27 approach
15. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 501 U.S. at 787–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
17. Id. at 1634.
18. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
19. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Kenji Yoshino attributes this move to “pluralism anxiety.”
See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011). Some
have argued that this shift effects a “constitutional displacement” rather than a reduction in
protections. See, e.g., id. (quoting Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
1410, 1417 (1974)). But Russell Robinson argues that the doctrinal treatment afforded
minorities in the equal protection context has not been as favorable as that for LGBT
couples, who have not been required, inter alia, to satisfy requirements pertaining to animus
applicable in race cases. See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
20. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015).
21. See, e.g., Brief for Legal Scholars Stephen Clark, Andrew Koppelman, Sanford
Levinson, Irina Manta, Erin Sheley, and Ilya Somin as Amici Curiae, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574); Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc. and NAACP as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574).
22. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599, 2615, 2619.
23. See id. at 2595.
24. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 855–56 (2004).
25. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
26. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598–99, 2602–03.
27. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (discussing the “double helix”

56

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

resurrected in Obergefell to the extent that it relies on both equality and due
process-based principles in invalidating Virginia’s interracial marriage
ban.28 Yet, the analysis ultimately renders portions of Loving somewhat
mute. Even Loving’s arguably most celebrated passage—which dismisses
the Virginia interracial marriage prohibitions then in effect as “measures
designed to maintain White Supremacy”29 and concludes that “restricting
the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause”30—gets deployed to
repackage the case’s focus and meaning. Notwithstanding the fact that so
many regard Loving as the decision that leveled the final blow to the third
rail of the Jim Crow system,31 Justice Kennedy insists that it is not a case
about “interracial marriage” but rather one about the “abiding connection
between marriage and liberty” under the Due Process Clause more
generally.32 The point here, to be clear, is not that Loving’s due processbased holding has no meaning. Indeed, I have elsewhere urged a greater
focus on it.33 But, in Obergefell, the weight of that passage gets
redistributed in a way that, rather than simply complementing the Loving
Court’s equal protection-based holding, eclipses it.
This sidelining of race means that the history of marriage on which
Obergefell relies is necessarily incomplete. In truth, inclusion within
marriage, as I argued earlier, has not always been dignity enhancing, as
Justice Kennedy’s opinion implies. In a recent article, I explore the
instrumental role that marriage has played over time in racial formation and
in the subordination of African Americans, but also of groups such as
Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Asian Americans.34 This and other
research suggests that mere entrance into marriage did not dramatically
change the status and prospects of Blacks in the postbellum period.35 For
formerly enslaved Blacks, any dignity that rights to legal marriage
conferred was often short lived.36 Those who chose to marry as a way of
approach of intertwining conceptions of due process and equal protection in Lawrence v.
Texas). For more on the treatment of equality and liberty concerns in recent marriage cases,
see Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights,
100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014); Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and Same-Sex
Marriage, 123 YALE L.J. 3076 (2014).
28. See Lenhardt, supra note 5, at 861–66 (discussing equal protection and due process
components of the Court’s decision in Loving).
29. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
30. Id. at 12.
31. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 17
(1994) (“The key sentence in Loving says that ‘the racial classifications [at issue] must stand
on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.’” (alteration
in original)).
32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
33. See generally Lenhardt, supra note 5.
34. See Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1324–43.
35. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation
of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 274–92 (1999).
36. For historical research on emancipated persons’ early experience with marriage
regulation, see, e.g., LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDERED STRIFE & CONFUSION: THE POLITICAL
CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION (1997); MARY FARMER-KAISER, FREEDWOMEN AND THE
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: RACE, GENDER & PUBLIC POLICY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION
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affirming loving relationships and attaining a measure of family integrity
denied them during bondage quickly found that marriage offered them little
protection from government intervention in their newly constituted
families.37 And those more enamored of nonmarital frames for organizing
their lives discovered that their status as freedperson gave them no freedom
at all when it came to affairs of the heart.38 In the postbellum era, marriage
was less an option than a command, as many formerly enslaved persons
were coerced, forced, and even tricked into formalizing intimate
relationships.39 Marriage laws regulated those who willingly entered into
legal marriage, but also those unmarried persons who existed in that
institution’s “shadow.”40
Reconstruction era marriage laws often functioned more to reassert
control over former slaves than to affirm their intimate choices and new
status as citizens.41 Whites saw marriage as a way to reconstruct the South,
as well as the nation overall.42 Officials at all levels of government thus
devoted themselves to the goal of “creating black [households], husbands
and wives,” using whatever means deemed necessary to ensure compliance
with its norms.43 The goal was not to establish Blacks as a people, but to
create the kind of citizens that served the objectives of Whites—those who
were sexually and gender compliant and, who could, perhaps most
importantly, internalize the tremendous dependency that many freedpersons
had upon emerging from slavery.44 Those who could not meet these
expectations often faced harsh punishments.45 For example, destitute
fathers unable to satisfy nineteenth century expectations for supportive
husbands quickly found themselves imprisoned and their children
involuntarily placed in “apprenticeships” that, not surprisingly, replicated
the labor arrangements of slavery.46
(2010); NORALEE FRANKEL, FREEDOM’S WOMEN: BLACK WOMEN AND FAMILIES IN CIVIL
WAR ERA MISSISSIPPI (1999); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); Franke,
supra note 35, at 308.
37. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1337.
38. See FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 91.
39. See STANLEY, supra note 36, at 45–46; Franke, supra note 35, at 296; see also
Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1327–28. Some states moved so quickly to institute black
marriage as a form of social control that some former slaves had no idea that they had been
married. See Franke, supra note 35, at 277 (discussing, inter alia, Mississippi law that
deemed Blacks “who do now and have heretofore lived and cohabited together as husband
and wife” to be deemed married as a matter of law); see also Civil Rights Act of 1865, ch. 4,
§ 3, 1865 Miss. Laws 82.
40. See Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1656 (2003).
41. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1327.
42. Id. at 1326–28.
43. Id.; Franke, supra note 35, at 302.
44. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1327.
45. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 80–87 (discussing use of vagrancy laws to
penalize noncompliance with marital obligations); Franke, supra note 35, at 296–97
(discussing role of courts in imposing punishment for noncompliance with marriage norms).
46. See Mary Farmer-Kaiser, “With a Weight of Circumstances Like Millstones About
Their Necks”: Freedwomen, Federal Relief, and the Benevolent Guardianship of the
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Over time, marriage as an institution worked in ways that primarily
served to marry African Americans—those who are married, as well as
those who are not—to second-class citizenship.47 A full exploration of all
the ways in which this has been true is not feasible in this Essay. But I have
argued that an institutional structure analysis would reveal the long reach of
marriage regulation in structuring black disadvantage and segregation.48
Just take the single example of Jim Crow era statutes that incorporated
antimiscegenation laws as a way of determining where a student might
attend school or, even more, where an individual might live.49 To the
extent that such segregation templates still undergird zoning decisions and
policy, we can understand them to provide concrete support for the notion
that marriage has not only functioned as a mechanism for racial
subordination, but that it has done so in ways that have disproportionately
affected the wealth and opportunity structures of countless Blacks.50
Research shows not only that the housing options open to Blacks are
different than those for other groups, but that this difference has
implications for access to education, transportation, and a host of other
benefits.51 In other words, marriage regulation, through its broad and often
troubling reach into areas as diverse as education, housing, child welfare,
public benefits, and even voting, has been instrumental in structuring race
and disadvantage in this country.52
II. MARRIAGE AS DIGNITY ENHANCING TODAY?:
WHY BOTH MARRIAGE DECLINE AND “BLACK LIVES MATTER”
Marriage simply has not had a lot to do with the recognition or
affirmance of black dignity historically.53 Nevertheless, could it be dignity

Freedmen’s Bureau, 115 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 412, 428–29 (2007); Franke, supra
note 35, at 285 n.167.
47. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1327, 1335.
48. Id. at 1335–43.
49. See, e.g., FRANKLIN JOHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION
CONCERNING THE FREE NEGRO 158–59 (1918) (citing North Carolina law that based the right
to attend a particular school on antimiscegenation law); City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d
712, 713 (4th Cir. 1930) (invalidating Richmond law that based eligibility to live in a
neighborhood on antimiscegenation law).
50. See Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1338–40.
51. See David Leonhardt, Middle-Class Black Families, in Low-Income Neighborhoods,
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/upshot/middle-classblack-families-in-low-income-neighborhoods.html?_r=0 (discussing a recent report on race
and housing) [http://perma.cc/34EH-6H3Y]; see also DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING
RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014).
52. See Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1338–43. For examples concerning public benefits
and voting, see Melinda Chateauvert, Framing Sexual Citizenship: Reconsidering the
Discourse on African American Families, 93 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 198, 198 (2008) (discussing
voting rights denial based on belief that black man fathered child out of wedlock); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure As the Revival
of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1653 (2005) (discussing marriage promotion
designed to reduce welfare reliance).
53. Some might argue that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), provides a notable
exception. But see Yoshino, supra note 27, at 3078–80 (discussing Bruce Ackermann’s view
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enhancing today? Notably, public disclosure on race typically occurs in the
register of equality, not dignity. The Supreme Court, for its part, has yet to
develop a robust doctrinal language for talking about dignity in the context
of race. Current race jurisprudence privileges a paper-thin, hyperformalistic notion of equality, one preoccupied with the treatment of
“innocent” Whites and essentially disinterested in the dehumanizing effects
of racial discrimination and disadvantage on African Americans and other
minorities.54
It has taken the demands of activists associated with the “Black Lives
Matter” movement and other groups to clear meaningful space to talk about
issues of dignity and race today.55 Outrage over the senseless, inhumane
shooting deaths of African Americans such as Michael Brown and Rekia
Boyd has not just focused important attention on our broken criminal justice
system, it has also raised new consciousness about the “devaluation of the
black body”56 and isolating, stigmatizing, and degrading effects of the
racial disadvantage and segregation that the Supreme Court has long
dismissively described as mere “societal discrimination.”57 It seems that,
for now at least, how African Americans actually live their lives now
matters to a growing segment of the population.
Investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice, non-profit institutions,
and scholars into events in places like Ferguson, Missouri have begun to
connect the dots between black inequality and the black deaths that have
increasingly been at the forefront of public discourse in recent months.58
We have the beginning of a national narrative about race and cumulative
disadvantage that increasingly makes sense of inequality markers such as
high black incarceration rates, segregated housing, and huge gaps in black
and white wealth.59 Yet, none of this changes the fact that, in the near term,
marriage just is not likely to advance black dignity or citizenship more
broadly.
On the numbers, as I have already discussed, marriage increasingly has
less and less to do with the lives of most Blacks. African Americans are
likely to hold the title of the least married group in the country for some

that Loving constitutes a misstep insofar as the Court failed to address the adverse effects of
the “institutionalized humiliation” achieved through antimiscegenation law).
54. See generally Elise C. Boddie, The Sins of Innocence in Standing Doctrine, 68
VAND. L. REV. 297 (2015).
55. See Claudia Rankine, The Condition of Black Life Is One of Mourning, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE (June 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/magazine/the-condition-ofblack-life-is-one-of-mourning.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/XQV3-GD88].
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
58. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 42–62 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/CV46MJR8].
59. See, e.g., id. See generally ROITHMAYR, supra note 51; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11;
Elise C. Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Lenhardt,
supra note 14.
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time to come.60 Marriage decline affects all groups, as the fact that the
percentage of married Americans fell from 72 to 52 percent between 1960
and 2010 suggests.61 But declines have been steepest in African America:
in 2008, Black marriage rates stood at merely 32 percent, down from 61
percent in 1960.62 Although, as with other groups, marriage rates are
lowest among the poor and those with low levels of educational
attainment,63 “[B]lacks in all educational groups [are] less likely to be in
intact marriages.”64
Even more, however, research in this area suggests that structural
inequality, as well as the norms associated with marriage itself, prevent or
at least discourage many African Americans from marrying. African
Americans consistently rate marriage as important and are very likely to
express a desire to marry in the future.65 But research by Kathryn Edin and
Maria Kefalas suggests that many poor Blacks may “avoid marriage not
because they think too little of it, but because they revere it.”66
“Uncertainty” and fears about not fulfilling traditional marriage roles seem
to prevent low-income, black heterosexual couples from actually
marrying.67 The belief that “to . . . do [marriage] ‘right,’” they must be on a
“solid economic footing,”68 may lead some Blacks to decouple childbirth
and marriage. In other words, structural inequality in areas such as housing,
employment, education, and mass incarceration works in ways that keep
marriage out of reach for many poor Blacks. “For poor [b]lack women, [in
particular,] socioeconomic circumstances translate into very high levels of
‘uncertainty’ in their intimate . . . lives”69 and may even be a barrier to
finding an appropriate partner.70
Marriage today reflects black inequality. What is arguably most
devastating where that institution’s ability to affirm the dignity of black
loving relationships is concerned, however, is that marriage and other
60. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
61. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES (2010)
[hereinafter DECLINE OF MARRIAGE], http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pewsocial-trends-2010-families.pdf [http://perma.cc/B7LK-2HZA].
62. Id. at 9 (comparing the “Current Marital Status” of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics).
63. See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); see also INST. FOR AM. VALUES &
NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE
NEW MIDDLE AMERICA 54–55 (2010) [hereinafter WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS].
64. WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS, supra note 63, at 54.
65. Id. at 134.
66. See KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN
PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 207 (2005).
67. LINDA C. MCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND
RESPONSIBILITY 138–41 (2006).
68. Id. at 140–41.
69. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1351 (citing Linda M. Burton & M. Belinda Tucker,
Romantic Unions in an Era of Uncertainty: A Post-Moynihan Perspective on African
American Women and Marriage, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 136–39
(2009) (describing the problem of “uncertainty” and its impact on the marriage choices of
Blacks)).
70. Kristen Harknett & Sara S. McLanahan, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Marriage
After the Birth of a Child, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 790, 804, 808 (2004).
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family law structures also shape such inequality, not to mention race itself.
Elsewhere, I have offered personal examples from my work as a legal
scholar who writes and teaches about race and family to support this
assertion.71 For more objective proof, however, we need only look at one
of the tragic incidents at the heart of the “Black Lives Matter” movement:
the shooting death of Walter Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina.
Scott was shot in the back after running away from a police officer after a
seemingly routine traffic stop for a broken tail light.72 The world focused
on a death that might otherwise have gone unnoticed because a bystander
used his cell phone to secretly record Scott’s shooting by Officer Michael
T. Schlager with a cell phone.73 For the purposes of this Essay, however,
the reason that Scott apparently ran is far more important. News reports
suggest that an outstanding warrant to pay eighteen thousand dollars in back
child support led to his ultimately fatal efforts to evade possible arrest.74
Having already been incarcerated and consequently lost a job for a similar
inability to pay support, Scott was desperate to avoid having to bear the
dual indignity of going to jail for unpaid child support and then losing
another job because of it.75 Our mechanisms for securing child support
payments nationwide have a disparate impact on African American men,
who are more likely to be unemployed and to be incarcerated than their
non-minority peers.76 States seek child support from married and
Nevertheless, we can understand such
unmarried parents alike.77
obligations at least to be informed by marital norms privileging patriarchy,
support, and the internalization of dependency.78 Existing law—to include
Obergefell’s implicit assumption that unmarried families are, as a
normative matter, somehow both less deserving of respect and central to the

71. R.A. Lenhardt, Structuring Families, Structuring Race, BALKINIZATION BLOG (Oct.
30, 2014, 10:38 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/10/structuring-families-structuringrace.html [http://perma.cc/YY3T-V9XD].
72. Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Appuzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with
Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/
south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html
[http://perma.cc/
9DTA-AKJ6].
73. Id.
74. Frances Robles & Sheila Dewan, Skip Child Support. Go to Jail. Lose Job.
Repeat., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/us/skip-childsupport-go-to-jail-lose-job-repeat.html [http://perma.cc/V2Z8-2CJN].
75. Id.
76. See Tonya Brito et al., “I Do for My Kids”: Negotiating Race and Inequality in
Family Court, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027, 3037 (2015); Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens:
Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349,
364–70 (2013).
77. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 362–63 (2012) (noting irrelevancy of marital status to
determinations of child support involving heterosexual couples). Some even impose support
obligations without regard to whether the parent is incarcerate, an approach to child support
enforcement that disproportionally affects Blacks to the extent that they are overrepresented
in the prison system. See Lenhardt, supra note 71 (reviewing HUNTINGTON, supra note 13).
78. See supra pp. 57–58.
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fabric of society79—privileges marriage in ways that render it both overly
punitive and insufficiently attuned to the needs of the poor and unmarried.80
This is probably nowhere more true than in the case of black, nonmarital,
female-headed households, which are disproportionately affected by such
laws.81
With the Princeton and Columbia University-affiliated Fragile Families
and Child Wellbeing Study—which follows 5000 children born in U.S.
cities between 1998 and 2000 and their families—we now have more
information about nonmarital or “fragile” families of all backgrounds.82
Such families, unsurprisingly, are overwhelmingly likely to be
disadvantaged.83 As a group, the women who primarily head such
families—whether single, cohabiting, or living without a partner—tend to
live in poverty and to have far fewer socioeconomic resources than their
married peers.84 But, nonmarital black families tend to be the most fragile
of the fragile.85
Black women in fragile families face tremendous degrees of
“uncertainty” in areas such as employment and housing.86 For example,
they are more likely to live below or near the poverty line than their white
counterparts.87 They are also more likely to be recent recipients of public
assistance and to describe their neighborhood as unsafe.88 Finally, although
they are more likely to live apart from romantic partners even if a
relationship survives post-birth, black women are more likely to have
additional children.89 The chances that black women will marry after the
birth of a child are only about 9 percent.90
79. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015) (“[T]he right to
marry . . . supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance.”).
80. See generally Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for
Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167 (2015).
81. See Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1348–53.
82. About the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, FRAGILE FAM. & CHILD
WELLBEING STUDY, http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/about.asp (last visited Sept. 27,
2015) [http://perma.cc/YQ6C-CWAN]. Fifty years ago, the Moynihan Report, of course,
addressed the issue of black nonmarital families and what it derisively described as the
growing “matriarchal pattern” within them. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 31 (1965)
[hereinafter MOYNIHAN REPORT], http://web.stanford.edu/~mrosenfe/Moynihan’s%20
The%20Negro%20Family.pdf [http://perma.cc/4MAZ-UXDB]. At the time, the black
nonmarital birth rate was 20 percent. See GREGORY ACS ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE
MOYNIHAN REPORT REVISITED 4 (2013) [hereinafter MOYNIHAN REVISITED],
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412839-The-Moynihan-Report-Revisited.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZV6B-ATZT]. Significantly, the percentage of black nonmarital births has
nearly tripled since then. Id. The rate of nonmarital births for Whites now stands at 20
percent, up from only 2 or 3 percent in 1965. Id.; see also Robert A. Hummer & Erin R.
Hamilton, Race and Ethnicity in Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE CHILD. 113, 113 (2010).
83. Hummer & Hamilton, supra note 82, at 121.
84. Id. at 120.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 127.
89. Id. at 120.
90. Id. at 118.
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The tremendous inequality that fragile black families confront
compounds the disparate effects that family law structures—i.e., those
regulating matters ranging from marriage to child custody to welfare to tax
benefits—have on nonmarital family units. Indeed, the primacy of marriage
as a regulatory device today means that family-related laws persist in
marrying Blacks to second-class status. Tax policy that incentivizes
marriage by extending benefits only to married couples rather than
nonmarital individuals provides a noteworthy example of this problem.91
State-imposed caps on welfare benefits under the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) program provides another.92 Welfare cap
programs limit the economic support that families bearing additional
children while on public assistance can receive.93 As Jill Hasday explains,
this “impose[s] an extreme financial hardship” on poor families, especially
those that qualify as fragile families in which multipartner fertility often
results and tends to result in family dissolution.94
TANF-based durational limits on welfare support stand as another
window into this problem. Under those provisions, poor women are
mandated to enter the workforce within a certain period95 to end the
dependency many wrongly believe that public assistance creates.96 In the
absence of meaningful support for childcare, however, these changes
disproportionately affect women of color, who are overrepresented among
recipients of welfare.97 As suggested by the tragic story of a black mother
recently prosecuted because she was so desperate for employment that,
when her childcare fell through, she briefly left her young children in the
car while she interviewed for a job,98 durational limits and other similar
policies significantly limit the capacity of single mothers to care for and
support their families.99 Their disparate racial impact raises serious

91. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 113 (2010) (arguing that “the state’s seeking to further twoparent families by awarding them economic resources not awarded to single-parent families
is a peculiarly bad tool to harmonize” family-related interests). State-imposed caps on
economic support for families bearing additional children while on public assistance provide
another important example. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 215 (2014);
see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 209–17 (1997) (discussing issues of race and family cap programs).
92. The TANF program was established as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 101–116, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110–2185;
see also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 52, at 1673–77.
93. See ROBERTS, supra note 91, at 219–20.
94. See HASDAY, supra note 91, at 214.
95. Ariel Kalil & Rebecca M. Ryan, Mother’s Economic Conditions and Sources of
Support in Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE CHILD. 39, 52–53 (2010).
96. See ROBERTS, supra note 91, at 219–20.
97. Kalil & Ryan, supra note 95, at 52.
98. Shaila Dewan, A Job Seeker’s Desperate Choice, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/business/a-job-seekers-desperate-choice.html
[http://perma.cc/EL3X-LA5T].
99. Kalil & Ryan, supra note 95, at 52.
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concerns, just as the racially discriminatory practices discussed in Part I
did.100
III. NONMARRIAGE AS DIGNITY ENHANCING?
African America, as I have previously noted, has never fully interrogated
the assumption—implicit in national law and policy, but also its own
narratives about family life—that black marriage “is at the foundation of all
our rights.”101 And perhaps because this is true, we have never fully
considered the ways in which family law structures such as marriage
contribute to racial inequality. The time to consider such issues is long
overdue and—insofar as anguish over recent police shootings and the
massacre of black worshippers by white supremacist Dylan Roof earlier this
summer now seems to flow across wide numbers of communities102—could
not be more opportune.
In effect, traditional marriage has limited our thinking and imagination
with respect to matters of race, dignity, and citizenship.103 While family
demographics have changed dramatically since 1965, proposals for
grappling with the structural inequality that increasingly limits the choices
and opportunities of nonmarital black families generally have not.
Conservatives still emphasize marriage as the way to solve African
America’s problems, despite documented doubts about its ability to singlehandedly address black need—or, increasingly, the needs of many nonBlacks.104 Others now urge birth control and a delay in childbearing until
economic security can be achieved.105 Yet, it seems clear that, without real
attention to the inequality that destabilizes black communities, most black
parents will never achieve the goal of economic security. What is needed is
a fundamental rethinking and restructuring of existing law and policies
concerning nonmarital families.
Demographics and the growing fragility of black loving relationships
demand a greater focus on nonmarriage. Our entire policy focus should not
be on eliminating such families, as urged by the popularly named Moynihan
Report—former U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s infamous and still
hotly debated exegesis on race, nonmarital black families, and

100. See supra Part I.
101. EDWARDS, supra note 36, at 47; see Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1353.
102. See Lizette Alvarez et al., In Charleston Funerals, Remembering Victims of Hate As
Symbols of Love, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/us/
charleston-south-carolina-shooting-funerals.html [http://perma.cc/BY4A-A57A].
103. See Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1353–62.
104. See, e.g., THOMAS SHAPIRO ET AL., INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y, THE ROOTS OF
THE WIDENING RACIAL GAP: EXPLAINING THE BLACK-WHITE ECONOMIC DIVIDE 6 (2013),
http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/Author/shapiro-thomas-m/racialwealthgapbrief.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7RMT-HWRB].
105. See, e.g., ISABEL V. SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND
PARENTHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE 22–28 (2014). Not insignificantly, such proposals ignore
the reality that, as Dorothy Roberts has noted, nonmarital births tend not to make African
Americans poor. Instead, Blacks, more than other groups, tend already to be poor when
nonmarital births occur. See ROBERTS, supra note 91, at 219.
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citizenship.106 Rather, I recommend an inquiry into the potential for
nonmarriage to secure black belonging. In suggesting that we explore
supporting nonmarital black families where they stand, rather than trying to
convert them into marital families, I do not advocate the abolition of
Instead, the proposal I advance imagines situating
marriage.107
nonmarriage alongside marriage as a framework for loving black
relationships. This shift in focus could generate critical support for
nonmarital black families, improving their economic situation and overall
standing in the broader community. The goal would be to ensure the
“flourishing” of all black families, not to pathologize those who, either by
choice or because of the structural inequality they confront, never enter
traditional marriage.108
Elsewhere, I consider proposals generated by family law scholars that, if
structured with an eye toward race, might provide a platform for real
change.109 Here, I will simply underscore that a critical piece in moving
forward will be eliminating the marriage myopia of existing law and policy.
Clare Huntington, for example, has advocated the development of a
“postmarital family law” with new norms and rules that better aid
nonmarital families navigating the challenges and poverty that they face.110
Revisions to federal and state programs regulating families will also be
imperative.
For example, President Obama’s January 2015 State of the Union
Address included proposals to expand child care and open access to Head
Start and universal preschool.111 These proposals hold concrete benefits for
nonmarital black families, as do initiatives that would increase the number
of workers benefitting from the protection of the Family and Medical Leave
Act (and similar state laws), and modifying federal tax policy would as
well.112 Proposals to restructure the Earned Income Tax Credit for the poor
could similarly improve the financial health and overall functioning of such
families.113
Finally, recognizing the resiliency and strengths of nonmarital families
will also be critical. Too often policy interventions begin with an
assumption that nonmarital families possess only “weaknesses” and no

106. See THE MOYNIHAN REPORT, supra note 82, at 47–48.
107. See Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1320.
108. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 13, at xii.
109. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1357–58.
110. See Huntington, supra note 80, at 173.
111. See President Barack Obama, 2015 State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2015/01/20/president-obamas-2015state-union-address [http://perma.cc/L46Q-E3MW]; see also Michelle Chen, This Unnoticed
Part of Obama’s Childcare Initiative Is a Big Deal, NATION (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/197105/unnoticed-part-obamas-childcare-initiative-big-deal#
[http://perma.cc/W2LU-ZC7Y].
112. See Eichner, supra note 91, at 35–47, 77–90, 113 (discussing the Family and
Medical Leave Act as well as state economic and policy support for caretaking
relationships).
113. See MOYNIHAN REVISITED, supra note 82, at 21.
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strengths.114 But reinforcing some of the strategies that such families
deploy in scaling uncertainty in areas such as housing, food security,
employment, and often complex relational ties could be very beneficial.
For example, research indicates that black nonmarital families navigate the
challenges of co-parenting and multipartner fertility better than some other
groups.115 Black men, in particular, do better than their white counterparts
at maintaining ties with nonresident children.116 Developing programs that
exploit these and other strengths, and focusing on generating new capacities
in this realm, could be very beneficial.
These and other suggestions for better supporting nonmarital black
families and ensuring that they are not left to shoulder the burden of
dependency and cumulative disadvantage alone could be beneficial to all
families, but especially those that are “fragile” and black. While many of
the benefits are economic in nature, the ideas explored here could generate
positive effects in other areas as well. Among other things, developing
nonmarital alternatives for family support would, as I have argued in other
work, reframe notions of race, gender, and family-based citizenship
overall.117 Incorporating nonmarriage into family law and policy could—
insofar as African Americans are likely to be the most unmarried group in
the country for some time to come—dramatically change the standing of
Blacks in American society.118 They might, in other words, begin to secure
a measure of belonging that has not hitherto been forthcoming.
CONCLUSION: THE PLACE OF DIGNITY AND FAMILIES
IN THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell should be celebrated
for the triumph of love and law that it represents. But we should guard
against becoming complacent in its wake. Merely having access to
marriage rights is not likely to afford LGBT individuals of any race the
legal protections and belonging to which they are entitled.
We are now one hundred and fifty years beyond the moment when the
guarantee of freedom from bondage became manifest and the period in
which many Blacks gained access to legal marriage. Yet, this country has
still not resolved the issues of race and citizenship that animated debates at
that time. Our discourse about race, in many ways, replicates the
conversations conducted then and in subsequent years. Notably, the
debates about race and marriage today are almost identical to those we had
fifty years ago, when the Moynihan Report was released.119

114. See MOYNIHAN REPORT, supra note 82, at 30.
115. Huntington, supra note 80, at 190.
116. Marcia J. Carlson et al., Coparenting and Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with
Young Children After a Nonmarital Birth, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 461, 473 (2008); Huntington,
supra note 80, at 190.
117. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1361.
118. See Dubler, supra note 40, at 1656.
119. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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Fortunately, the national conversation about race that has been sparked
by recent events and the grassroots organizing of “Black Lives Matter” and
other groups holds great promise, notwithstanding the recent complaints of
conservatives.120 It has brought a much needed focus on black dignity and
its relationship to racial inequality. We must continue to address the
criminal justice concerns highlighted by the deaths of Michael Brown and
others, as well as inequality in areas such as housing, education, and
employment. But we cannot stop there.
This Essay has urged an added focus on marriage and other familyrelated systems that help to structure race. Family law-related institutions,
systems, and policies intersect with other forms of disadvantage in ways we
often fail to appreciate. We need to begin to think of institutions such as
marriage in the same way that we do segregated schools and housing. I fear
that, if we resist understanding laws and policies concerning families as a
key instrument in structuring race and inequality, the quest for black dignity
and equal citizenship will always be elusive. The place of black families—
whether marital or nonmarital, same- or opposite-sex—in our society is as
important a civil rights issue as any facing African America today.121

120. See Editorial, The Truth of ‘Black Lives Matter’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/opinion/the-truth-of-black-lives-matter.html (disputing
conservative claims that the “Black Lives Matter Movement” incites racial hatred)
[http://perma.cc/83PQ-ZK7D].
121. See Chateauvert, supra note 52, at 200 (discussing failure of early black leaders to
identify family-related issues as civil rights matters).

